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The Indian subcontinent is home to the world’s largest concentration of Muslims, now about 400 
million people, but scholarship on South Asian Muslim laws has always been a minority 
phenomenon, marginalised between Middle East-focused Islamic Studies and Hindu-focused 
South Asian Studies. Today, more than ever, one cannot possibly understand South Asian laws 
without reference to Muslim law. The realities ‘on the ground’ point to complex interactions 
between various state laws, religious laws and local customary laws, all of which contain Muslim 
elements, not so much in their original Middle Eastern form as in South Asian adaptations. 
 
Linking this scenario to the worldwide debates about ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, globalisation 
and regionalisation, ethnic plurality and national uniformity, not to mention issues of gender 
equality and human rights, one can easily see that the current debates about the place of Islamic 
laws in South Asia are extremely complex. This makes them very relevant for scholars of the 
Muslim legal world. South Asia today is a laboratory of the contemporarisation of Islamic laws. 
Careful study is repaid by insights which other jurisdictions in the world do not offer because 
their conceptual chemistry is so different. As in the Maghreb, such debates not only take up 
ancient discussions about the sources of traditional Islamic laws and the right to interpret them, 
they also concern the crucial interaction of religious and local customary traditions, as well as 
extremely instructive debates about the role of the modern state vis-à-vis Islam, the place of 
women, and the development of a modern Islamic economic system. 
 
Such complex debates are today no longer restricted to South Asia and the developing world. 
Following World War II, the emigration of South Asian Muslims to many countries of the world, 
particularly in the West, has created new interaction patterns between various legal and social 
systems in Western countries and Islamic law. We are only just beginning to analyse this 
emergent field of legal reconstruction.2 It is apparent that we are still confused about whether this 
field of study falls in the realm of law or of anthropology. In a forthcoming book on Muslim 
law,3 the new hybrid phenomenon of Muslim law in England is encapsulated in the term angrezi 
shariat. This refers basically to the now publicly emerging forms of British Muslim law which 
can only be observed if one relies not merely on textbooks, legislation and reported cases, but 
ventures out into the community to understand the legal issues that arise at the local and 
individual level, rather than as big political issues. 
 
The present article examines the complex interactive South Asian scenario in a brief overview 
and then draws attention to several legal topics which have recently confirmed that South Asian 
Muslim legal scholarship remains one of the most exciting fields of study open to South 
Asianists and others. Particular attention is given here to the treatment of religious minorities, 
new conceptualisations of public law, and some contentious family law issues. 
                                                 
     1 ) Senior Lecturer in South Asian Laws, Law Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
 of London. 
     2 ) See Michael King (ed.), God's Law Versus State Law. The Construction of an Islamic Identity in Western 
 Europe. London: Grey Seal, 1995. 
     3 ) David Pearl and Werner Menski, Muslim Law. London: Sweet&Maxwell, 1997 (forthcoming). 
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Locating the Muslim presence: State law, religions and customs in South Asia 
 
The interactive relations between state law, religious laws and local customary laws in South 
Asia were made more complex by the transition from the various colonial regimes (mainly 
British, also French and Portuguese) to independent nation states, all of which have been 
struggling with the treatment of religious and ethnic minorities. When the subcontinent was 
divided into India and Pakistan in 1947,  Muslims became a large and thus powerful minority in 
India (now c. 12% of  the population, well over 120 million people). Conversely, Pakistan was 
created as a state for Muslims but retained about 12% Hindu population, with particularly large 
concentrations in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. The ethnic diversity of Panjabi-dominated 
West Pakistan and Bengali East Pakistan introduced numerous complications in working out the 
foundations of a new Muslim state, Pakistan, after 1947. Appeals to Muslim brotherhood, the 
ummah and other aspects of solidarity could not stop the emergence of Bangladesh, in 1971, as a 
new nation state with a large Muslim majority. 
 
The presence of minorities, thus, has continued to be a legally relevant fact of life in South Asian 
states, despite gruesome ethnic cleansing after 1947 which involved many millions of people on 
both sides. This should be an important lesson for debates about ethnic cleansing anywhere in the 
world today. By the mid-1990s, the share of non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan and Bangladesh 
has decreased, largely by conversions in Pakistan and emigration in Bangladesh, while Indian 
Muslims have been increasing. Pakistan today is home to quite small minorities of Hindus, 
Christians and others (about 4% in total), while Bangladesh has a Hindu minority of c. 15 %, 
which is apparently under intense pressure.4 
 
All three states have been pursuing particular policies to accommodate Islamic law and it is 
remarkable how widely these differ. India, aware from the start that it would be the home of a 
large Hindu majority as well as a huge Muslim minority and others, opted for a strategy of 
secularism which differs from Western conceptualisations of that strategic term. It focuses on 
equidistance from all religions, thereby taking explicit account of religious pluralism.  Giving a 
defined place to the personal laws, it has been argued, creates much potential for conflict. But 
this arrangement also takes good care of pluralism, so that Indian Muslims remain today 
governed by shari'a, mainly in the sphere of family law, while the various elements of the general 
law apply to all persons irrespective of religion.  
                                                 
     4 ) Taslima Nasreen's novel  Lajja contains a powerful depiction of such pressures which have now been giving 
 rise to asylum claims in Europe, some of which have been successful. On the legal position of non-Muslim 
 minorities in Bangladesh see Werner Menski and Tahmina Rahman, "Hindus and the Law in Bangladesh", 
South Asia Research 8.2 (1988), 111-131. 
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In this arrangement, the secular state law, while respecting religion, still insists that it remains 
the dominant legal authority, rather than religion or custom, the other contenders for supremacy. 
India follows, thus, a Western model of political ideology while still not refusing to acknowledge 
 the competing powers of religion and local customary laws. The result is a legal system marked 
by immense internal diversity, giving rise to unresolved and often quite confused debates about 
protection of human rights, equality before the law and the desirability of a uniform civil law 
which do not centrally concern us here. Let us note, however, that India has so far quite 
successfully countered the multiple pressures to abandon the secular path and to turn into an 
avowedly Hindu state. If we look beyond dramatised headlines about Hindu fundamentalism in 
the recent past, we see that Muslims actually have a secure conceptual place in the Indian 
political and legal system. This does not mean that there is no discrimination, but it is impossible 
for the state to overlook the presence of Muslims and others as minorities. 
 
In Pakistani law, partly as a result of the common colonial heritage, the overall structural picture 
is quite similar to that in India. Within the personal law system, Muslim law became of course 
the majority law in 1947 but the minority laws also have a structural niche which cannot be 
simply defined away. While there appeared to be an early commitment to secularism in Pakistan, 
too, which needs to be researched further in the light of current South Asian debates, the Islamic 
nature of the entire legal system has subsequently been reinforced in a series of measures which 
can be summed up in the term ‘Islamisation’. Public (and even private) commitment to Islam was 
ideologically established and reinforced by the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which provided 
that all Muslims should be "enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in 
accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the 
Sunna".5 This declaration subsequently became the Preamble to the first Pakistani Constitution 
of 1956, then to the 1962 Constitution, and finally to the 1973 Constitution. During the heavily 
politicised movement towards Islamisation under General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s, Presidential 
Order No. 14 of 1985 turned the Objectives Resolution into a substantive provision of the 1973 
Constitution, now found in Article 2A. This,  by a stroke of the pen, changed the chemistry of the 
entire Pakistani state legal system. It now became clearer that being Pakistani and being a 
Muslim were still more closely linked and that the fundamental right to freedom of religion for 
non-Muslims would be impaired. This has had dramatic consequences particularly for the 
Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, who have been declared non-Muslims.6 
However, despite much lipservice to Islam and an explicit recognition of divine superiority in the 
Pakistani constitution, modern Pakistani and Bangladeshi laws, typical for state legal systems, 
still operate on the basis that the modern state law is the dominant legal authority. Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, too, therefore follow Western models of political ideology but try to match these, as 
best they can, with Islamic concepts. It is no surprise, then, that Islamisation has become a key 
element of debate and controversy.7 However, this politicisation of religion is hardly a new 
phenomenon, since concern about Islamisation  precedes Pakistani independence.8 Still, the 
mandate of a new country created specifically for Muslims gave fresh impetus to thinking about 
what ‘Islamic’ means. Significantly, the Objectives Resolution respects the fact that being a 
Muslim is a matter for individuals, giving the state a supporting and enabling role, although the 
reference to the public sphere indicates the potential for pressure on individuals.9  
                                                 
     5 ) See G. W. Choudhury, Constitutional Development in Pakistan. Second ed. Vancouver: University of 
British  Columbia, 1969, 35. 
6)  See in detail Yohanan Friedman, Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and its 
 Medieval Background. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. 
     7 ) For a detailed study see Rubya Mehdi, The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan. Richmond: Curzon Press, 
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While in India the state has shied away from reforms of Muslim law, focusing instead on Hindu 
law reforms, the Pakistani post-Independence scenario empowered the state to introduce 
important reforms to Islamic laws. These reforms were, however, perceived as anti-Islamic 
especially by the ulema and fierce debates arose in the 1950s about the role of the modern state 
law vis-à-vis Islamic laws. Lots of compromises were made and the resulting legal reforms to 
Pakistani family law, found in the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, have generated 
controversial debates which extend to the present day and will be discussed further below. Such 
controversial agenda of law reform also created some confusion among the few academics who 
studied South Asian Muslim laws and it is perhaps fair to say today that this field has remained 
imperfectly analysed. At the same time, the more prominent topic of Islamisation of laws took 
centre stage from the 1970s onwards.  
 
Today, we are in a position to begin to analyse the interactions of modern, liberal reforms of the 
1960s with the legal developments of the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, it is becoming clearer 
that anti-colonial protest, i.e. the dissatisfaction of having to continue the colonial legal 
framework, was mixed with a search for ‘true’ Islamic roots which is so very typical of the South 
Asian scenario. The resulting islamised legal system of modern Pakistan has become fairly well-
known in the West because of a series of Hudood Ordinances in 1979, which have led to 
miscarriages of justice against women, in particular.10 Thus, the conceptually complete but 
actually piecemeal Islamisation of the Pakistani legal system, merely replacing some provisions 
of the colonial laws with Islamic rules, has not been an unqualified success. In fact some experts 
argue that it has had no effect at all and appears to be more like political gimmickry.11 
 
A prominent example in this context is the old Indian Evidence Act of 1872, which was 
supplemented by the Quanun-e-Shahadat Order of 1984 to the effect that the testimony of two 
women should now be equal to that of one man. Not surprisingly, such reforms have led to much 
critical commentatory, but the level of analysis and knowledge has remained low. To date, it is 
not quite clear whether these reforms were really much more than politicised chess moves to 
placate certain lobbies. One can say this so firmly because at the same time, when it comes to 
real courtroom situations, Pakistani law has very significantly relaxed the evidence requirements 
for women testifying in courts in their own cases. The judicial assumption in this regard  is that 
Muslim women do not run to courts for every little matter. Thus, if a woman is ready to testify in 
court, there must be truth in her version of the story. As we shall see in more detail further 
below, this has recently achieved most effective changes in the Pakistani law on khula under 
section 8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, which is now very widely used by 
Muslim wives.12 
                                                                                                                                                        
 1994. 
     8 ) See in particular the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1937 with its several  
 amendments. 
     9 ) Indeed, this kind of legal regulation has also justified police intrusion into the private sphere and has 
 given rise to much-resented abuses of such powers in Pakistan. 
     10 ) On this see in particular Mehdi, as n.7. 
     11 ) So, in essence, Charles Kennedy, Islamization of Laws. Islamabad: IPS, 1996. 
 
     12 )  This has put the otherwise leading case of Khurshid Bibi (PLD 1967 SC 97) into perspective, for the 
majority  of cases on khula now appear to be decided under section 8 of the 1961 Ordinance, no doubt 
inspired by the  trail-blazing Khurshid Bibi judgement of 1967. 
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Apart from constitutional law, the focus of Pakistani legal debates has been on family law, on 
zina and inevitably on riba. Such debates have resurrected old conflicts and tensions in Islamic 
jurisprudence.13 Official attempts to islamise the law threw up the problem of the internal 
diversity of conceptualisations about Islam. Being a Hanafi Sunni majority country, Pakistan 
could not claim to be uniform in its understanding of shariat beyond the very basics of 
submission to Allah and belief in the Qur’an as God’s word. The Ahmadiyya problems of 
Pakistan signify this most clearly, for most Ahmadiyyas view themselves as Hanafi Sunnis. 
Unfortunately such problems go further, with frequent reports of Sunni/Shii violence and even 
killings. This partly explains the growing public disgust in Pakistan today about how law and 
religion are being abused for political gain. 
 
In my view, one can explain some of this self-inflicted violence in Pakistan as the indirect 
consequence of a misguided approach to uniformity which underlies this particular nation state. 
Differently put, a key problem appears to be the reluctance to accept and admit plurality, in a 
political as well as a religious sense, as an integral part of human life. In terms of more recent 
ethnic analyses, it could be said that the unwillingness and inability to recognise ‘the other’, even 
the Muslim ‘other’, lies at the core of such continued violence. We see here that the starting 
point of Pakistan as a country for ‘the Muslims’ is continuing to cause enormous problems. For, 
this idealised aim was never absolutely attainable. Thus, in modern Pakistan, lingering 
resentment against the continued presence of religious minorities hits not only non-Hanafi 
Sunnis, but all kinds of 'others'. Since religion does not operate in a closed field, socio-economic 
tensions interfere in this minefield of conflicts, too. The obvious religious and ethnic dimensions 
of such conflicts intersect and magnify the problem from time to time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of religions on constitutional laws 
 
We have already seen that South Asian state legal systems claim overall control, while 
recognising the key element of religious authority. Despite Islamisation,  Pakistan is certainly not 
a theocracy. Today, the sometimes desperate desire among politicians to Islamise the legal 
system comes out in new rules which make eating in public places during Ramadan a crime for 
any person, whether Muslim or not, thus imposing an Islamic order on everyone present in that 
state. Let us note here that precisely this kind of official legal pressure is opposed today by 
Muslims in European countries when they protest that the secular legal rule systems force them, 
or their children, as it were, to conform to non-Islamic patterns of actions, behaviour and dress.  
Islamisation in Pakistan, and to some extent in Bangladesh, thus, has placed religion at the core 
of  debates about the future of the respective legal and social system and any spokesperson finds 
it easy to use religion as a support mechanism for his or her private views. 
 
                                                 
     13 ) See in particular Noel J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence. Chicago 1969. Coulson 
 was certainly aware of Pakistani debates at the time. 
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If we contrast the Indian scenario with developments in Pakistan, we see that secularisation in 
India appears to have made religion more invisible, which has been welcomed by many 
commentators. However, religion has certainly not become non-existent; it resurfaces in 
unexpected quarters. Thus, the secular Indian Constitution, virtually prohibiting religious 
discourse, has been promoting a human rights language which appears to be religiously neutral 
and certainly forces judges to conceal their private religiosity. Indian judges have become 
masters at discussing religious and moral aspects of the law while leaving religious terminology 
out of their discourse. As one famous member of the old guard of leading judges in India, Mr. 
Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, told an audience of law students in London a decade ago, in his 
position it was meritorious to cite American cases but still essential to think like an Indian. In the 
current re-assessment of modern South Asian public laws and their revolutionary approach to 
securing legal justice for millions of people who do not even have enough to eat, such revealing 
comments disclose the continuing strong link between law and religion, and law and morality, 
while the language chosen is that of rational secularism. It only strikes analysts who know 
enough about South Asian religions and their conceptual underpinnings that this language can in 
fact be read as a code for a universalistic duty-focused philosophy, based on the key concept that 
all life forms are invisibly interlinked. Thus, any human action involves an inherent element of 
accountability to the whole, whether it be one’s spouse or family, the local community, the state, 
or ultimately superhuman powers, however defined. In their own ways, all South Asians can 
make sense of this, it is a basic part of their culture, and thus remains unexpressed in formal legal 
discourse. 
 
Modern Indian jurisprudence, thus, is certainly not an avowedly Hindu jurisprudence; it is, 
however, a Hinduism-inspired jurisprudence with a guilt complex. Not surprisingly, the current 
fashion to view everything on earth in human rights terms has been very eagerly copied in India 
because it allows Indian lawyers, that little bit longer, to paper over the immense conceptual 
differences which distinguish Western model jurisprudence from the immensely hybrid South 
Asian jurisprudential concepts which involve recourse to Hindu as well as Muslim belief 
structures. In the near future, this rapidly emerging current discourse will be forced to address 
much more openly the key issue that religion cannot be left out of debates on future legal 
development. 
 
In contrast, Pakistan’s Islamisation process has had the opposite effect, propelling debates about 
law in a language that uses Islam and shariat all the time. Since everything under the sun can be 
discussed in terms of a religion that is a way of life, too, functionaries of the law are encouraged 
to produce public declarations of private belief and to rephrase their own religious views as legal 
opinions. We find the familiar concept of ray in full action. In Pakistan, this has been further 
promoted by the institution of the Federal Shariat Court.14 We should not expect, thus, that any 
aspects of Islamic law have become clearer through the Pakistani case law. In fact, because there 
is so much scope for private and individual Muslim opinion, dressed as legal authority through 
the voice of judges, Pakistani case law constantly throws up remarkably controversial judgments, 
at all levels.15  This, however, seems typical of Islamic legal discourse generally.16  
                                                 
     14 ) A prime example of this phenomenon has been Mr. Justice Tanzil-ur-Rehman, who for many years used his 
 platform in the Karachi High Court to produce important judgments on all matters of Islamic law and then, 
 on his elevation to the Federal Shariat Court, continued that policy with great vigour. Since his retirement 
 from the Bench, such well-researched judgments have become markedly rarer. 
     15 )  One remarkable judgment concerns riba. It would appear to direct that the entire Pakistani  
  economic system should be Islamised and freed from riba. It is found reported at PLD 1992 FSC 1.  
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Social conflict in the judicial arena 
 
The most recent example of this kind in Pakistan, typically in family law, concerns the case of an 
adult Hanafi woman whose father was unhappy about her choice of life partner and pleaded in 
court that Muslim women of any age do not have the right to give themselves away in marriage. 
This so-called Saima case is still pending in early 1997, but press reports of the proceedings 
(which immediately went around the world) strongly confirm old prejudices about the patriarchal 
structures of Pakistani Muslim society and the lack of freedom for women to make important 
decisions about their own life. While it is undoubtedly worrying that such cases are brought to 
courts in the first place, one needs to be aware that litigation in South Asian countries serves 
multiple functions. Particularly in Pakistan, religious discourse is likely to be a cover for some 
social conflict.  
 
Recently, I debated this case with a class of law students in Pakistan.17 It quickly became 
apparent in our discussion that the traditional Hanafi Muslim law would actually grant the 
woman an almost unqualified right to dispense with the wali. Muslim religious tradition here 
obviously sided with the woman, so why all the fuss? The fact that her father protested and even 
went to court, and that the judge gave signals that he would concur with his view, can be read as 
an attempt to impress on Muslim women in Pakistan that they should listen to males. It is also 
strong evidence of social - rather than religious - concern that so many young people in Pakistan 
today appear to be choosing their spouses without the involvement of their families. It is too 
simple, then, to view this case and its underlying debate merely as an indication of a struggle 
between traditional religion and modern society, it is a struggle within modern society itself. The 
father and the judge, two males, speak here as members of a Muslim society today which sees 
itself overrun by foreign influences of a perceived immoral nature. The criticism is a general 
social one, therefore, directed as much at the young man who enticed the woman away than at 
the woman herself. The attempt is to protect modern Pakistani society from media-induced 
patterns of self-centred Western life styles. The medium chosen is, significantly, a public one, 
the courtroom. The judge's message is intended to be a public sermon: Do not follow the West, 
stick to Islamic traditions, which in this case so obviously involves an appeal to local customary, 
rather than strictly speaking Islamic rules. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
However, this judgment is still under appeal to the Supreme Court and so has not become effective. This 
confirms the politicised nature of this particular debate, in which the legal process is used as a bargaining 
 tool rather than a means to decide the issue in hand. 
     16 )   On the continuing Islamic debates about major issues like abortion, garar and riba, see now Rüdiger 
Lohlker, Schari'a und Moderne. Diskussionen über Schwangerschaftsabbruch, Versicherung und Zinsen. Stuttgart: 
Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner, 1996 [Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Band LI.3]. 
 
     17 ) I must acknowledge here my gratitude to the British Council in Pakistan, which promotes educational 
 exchange visits and frank discussions about contentious legal issues. A group of brainy law students at the 
 Pakistan College of Law in Lahore will find some of their arguments reproduced here. It is therefore my 
 pleasant duty to record their input into this debate. 
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It transpires, therefore, and is of relevance much beyond this particular case, that there is 
growing awareness in South Asia today that the West does not offer adequate and sustainable 
models for social and legal development. This realisation is not new but has become immensely 
strong during the 1980s in India and the 1990s in Pakistan and Bangladesh. It has propelled an 
ongoing search for indigenous models of development, be they Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, or indeed 
Islamic. Many books have been written in the past few years, particularly in Pakistan, trying to 
throw light on how early Islamic structures regulated important socio-legal issues which continue 
to arise today.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New South Asian constitutionalism and halal constitutional law 
 
Significantly, this kind of search is conducted both in the spheres of private and of public law. 
Before we turn to family law issues, two matters of ‘public importance’, the key phrase under 
Article 184(3) of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, need to be discussed briefly. Firstly, in the 
Muslim-dominated, islamising legal environment of Pakistan, more so than in Bangladesh, 
religious minorities have not been given adequate representation within the political and legal 
system, in fact within the state system as a whole. It helps the dominant Muslim group that the 
minorities themselves are deeply divided over how to achieve more adequate representation. 
While Pakistan does not have, as far as I know, a single non-Muslim in a higher judicial position, 
a recent Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court was a Muslim and  a female Muslim former 
Judge of the Supreme Court is now the Governor of one of the major Indian states. There is 
Muslim representation at all levels which is more than tokenism, it reflects a plural reality and its 
official acceptance as a basis for democratic governance. Secularisation and Islamisation, thus, 
concern not only the relative power of law and religion, they have definite implications on who 
can, and who can not, speak on behalf of the law and represent the public. It is not possible here 
to elaborate on discrimination, but this is obviously a key issue and the differences between India 
and Pakistan are stark, with Bangladesh placed somewhere in the middle 
 
                                                 
     18 ) See for example Liaquat Ali Khan Niazi, Islamic Law of Tort. Lahore: Dayal Singh Trust Library and 
Nasim Hasan Shah, Law, Justice and Islam. Lahore: Wajidalis, 1989. 
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Discrimination is  not restricted to the religious sphere alone. No legal example shows this 
better than the recent debates in South Asia about the role of judicial activism and public interest 
litigation, which is a new technique of vindicating basic rights and enforcing accountability of 
those in positions of power.19 In post-colonial countries which adopted Western-style 
constitutions promising equality before the law but overlooking social inequalities, the past few 
decades have shown a growing gulf between the privileged few and the virtually rightless 
masses. Justice-focused public interest litigation techniques have highlighted severe abuses of 
the law and of human rights in all South Asian countries and have thus led to a reassessment of 
the role of law in the process of governance. Much more so - - and ten years earlier - - than in 
Pakistan, Indian public interest litigation has revolutionised the way in which we look today at 
fundamental rights. In essence, this is a pro-poor law, taking away well-established privileges 
from those ‘men with long purses’ who can afford to make the law work for themselves while 
overlooking the basic rights of others. It is obvious that such legal revolution will not go 
unchallenged and unopposed but the remarkable trend in India has been that activist judges, 
rather than pro-establishment judges, have seen themselves promoted to higher posts. By now, 
this has created its own establishment structure.  
 
In Pakistan, and now also in Bangladesh, the courts have been aware of developments across the 
border but have not wanted to copy Indian law as such. The result has been a very successful 
Islamisation of public interest law by swiftly declaring it halal, through the simple reasoning that 
Islam stands for justice, so public interest litigation itself must be Islamic.20 
 
Notably, this form of justice is not based on the understanding that equal rights are just. Thus, 
South Asian legal systems, operating a hybrid of Western concepts and non-Western ideas and 
structures, are forever debating not only human rights, but also what the precise role of Islamic 
law today should be in working out sustainable legal systems for the next century. In that 
context, it is noteworthy that modern South Asian states are claiming to be welfare states, in the 
sense that they will guard the welfare of their citizens, but will not actually make financial 
provisions for citizens who are indigent. Given the demographic realities and socio-economic 
facts, that would be an impossible task for any South Asian state today. Thus, the modern 
developments of South Asian jurisprudence, inspired by Hindu and Muslim concepts of good 
governance, use the mechanisms of state law to induce and where necessary enforce, self-control 
mechanisms. In real terms, this means pressure on families, for example, to maintain members 
who are in need of support. It means that the social services provisions which Western countries 
have become accustomed to are not even going to be built up in South Asian jurisdictions. Rather 
than wasting energies on deploring this, modern analysts need to consider how this can be done 
more effectively. Muslim concepts of charity, whether in the form of zakat or waqf, need to be 
re-assessed in this respect. 
 
                                                 
19)  I understand that Dutch law has some interesting things to say on standing and  justiciability, but 
 we must restrict ourselves to South Asian law. 
20) This is also reiterated in the most recent Bangladeshi case on public interest litigation, which even  
 tries to claim, very patriotically, that this is a Bangladeshi invention based on Islamic principles.  This case 
is not yet reported officially. 
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Significantly, Bangladesh has been taking a middle position between avowed Islamisation as 
in Pakistan and secularism à la India. Starting off from socialist, secular rhetoric and principles, 
Bangladesh has moved some way towards Islamisation, but has faced much more opposition in 
that respect from local cultural forces as well as religious minorities, who rightly feel threatened 
by such moves. Thus, today, the laws of all three countries discussed here remain similar, 
coming from the same roots, but they vary enormously in detail. This is most obviously manifest 
in family law. 
 
South Asian debates about Muslim family laws 
 
We saw that post-colonial South Asian states have primarily given reformatory attention to their 
respective majority personal law. Thus in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Muslim  law received much 
and early attention. After fierce debates during the 1950s, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 
1961 was promulgated by a benevolent dictator. In India, by contrast, the Muslim personal law 
has been left almost untouched by the modern state law, while Hindu law has been subjected to 
wide-ranging legislative reforms in 1955/56 and again in 1976. This brief overview concentrates 
on three issues of particular relevance, polygamy, divorce and maintenance for Muslim wives 
during and after a marriage. 
 
Readers will be aware of the Qur’anic foundations of Muslim polygamy and the ensuing debates 
over the extent of the husband’s discretions with regard to having up to four wives at the same 
time. While Indian law criminalised and outlawed polygamy for Hindu men in 1955, Muslim 
men in India can continue to have up to four wives. This position is constantly challenged in 
politicised debates and occasionally comes up in court cases, but it is now something of an ‘old 
hat’. There has not been a serious political will in India for the total abolition of polygamy, 
among Muslims or any other community, because social concerns continue to show that in many 
situations women actually benefit from polygamous arrangements. 
 
In contrast, so it appears at first sight, Pakistan and Bangladesh have outlawed Muslim polygamy 
through section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. However, close analysis of that 
section and the case law under it shows this to be a figment of imagination. The effect of the 
various provisions under section 6 is that (i) a Muslim husband ought to ask his existing wife or 
wives for permission if he wants to marry another woman; (ii) he should also ask the permission 
of a kind of local authority; and (iii) he should be punished with monetary fines and/or 
imprisonment if he violates the requirements under this section. In reality, as numerous court 
decisions prove, almost all Muslim polygamists in Pakistan and Bangladesh remain unpunished 
and husbands are not put to rigorous tests over the issue of permission of an existing wife or 
wives. The modern state law, based on Islamic and local cultural values, does not achieve what a 
plain reading of the statute would seem to suggest.  
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Thus, polygamy in all South Asian countries continues to be an ambiguously viewed fact of 
life. From a Western perspective, this is regularly seen as unacceptable, but now Muslims in 
Europe, too, are claiming that in certain situations the Islamic allowances for polygamy are more 
appropriate today than the dishonest ban on polygamy for ideological reasons, which pushes 
individuals into illegality and forces couples to divorce rather than making mutually convenient 
arrangements with third parties. Such arguments may not take account of the fact that many 
women may be forced into such arrangements. However, the current debates have also not paid 
enough attention to the protective mechanisms for polygamously married women who do not 
want to complain. Islamic law itself, as well as the modern state laws of South Asia, contain  
safeguards for unhappy wives, while the modern state laws do not really side with the idealised  
model of legal monogamy and refuse to implement their own rules unless women vigorously 
complain.This particular debate will not go away in South Asia and the strong South Asian 
Muslim presence in many European countries has already given it fresh impetus. 
 
Coming to Muslim divorce, the traditional Islamic law on talaq will be familiar to readers. The 
South Asian predilection for the talaq-al-bida, the instantly effective form of talaq, is a well-
known fact.21  Modern Indian law, again, has not interfered in this aspect of Muslim law and thus 
offers Muslim wives no protection against being thrown out of a marriage without any defence. 
However, as shown below, Indian law has sought to establish some protective mechanism for 
women through maintenance laws. Indian law generally has moved more and more towards the 
‘irretrievable breakdown’ model of  divorce. This is of course remarkably similar to the Muslim 
system of divorce, in that the spouse whose partner wants to terminate the marriage contract 
really has no meaningful defence. Debates about Muslim divorce law in India have often been 
dishonest, therefore, in failing to mention that a talaq, after all, is not so different from a modern 
divorce.  
                                                 
     21 ) See David Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987, 101-102.  
The most recent study on Muslim divorce law in India is Furqan Ahmad: Triple Talaq. An Analytical Study 
 with Emphasis on Sociological Aspects. New Delhi: Regency, 1994. 
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Pakistani Muslim law, in the still idealistic reformative mood of the 1950s, seriously sought 
top lace some procedural impediments in the path of a Muslim husband who wanted to get rid of 
his wife with minimal fuss. In effect, section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 
stipulates that a Muslim husband may still pronounce talaq in whatever form he pleases, but it 
would not have instant effect and would be subject to reconciliation and notice requirements. In 
other words, it would really be rather like a talaq-al-ahsan. By the 1990s, we know  that these 
rules were just clever legal fictions. The case law of the 1960s still held that a talaq without 
notice to the wife and the local authority would be invalid.22 However, already by the 1970s, 
cases of abandoned Muslim wives who had married another man began to come to the notice of 
courts. Soon after the introduction of the Zina Ordinance in 1979, prosecution cases for zina 
began to appear in which ex-husbands who had simply discarded their wife earlier suddenly 
'remembered' that they were still married according to the official law.23 Looking at the facts of 
such cases, courts in Pakistan decided swiftly that, in certain circumstances, written notice of the 
Muslim divorce would not be an essential prerequiste for legal validity. Then, by the mid-1980s, 
Pakistan’s Islamisation had the effect that a husband’s talaq was now held to be instantly valid 
because this was so under shari’a.24 By the 1990s, section 7 of the 1961 Ordinance is still on the 
statute book but its provisions are more or less totally superseded by the re-assertion of shari’a 
law in Pakistan. This development has not yet been properly analysed and therefore has not yet 
been vigorously criticised. However, something else has happened in Pakistani law (not, 
however, officially in Bangladeshi law) in the meantime and has also escaped notice of the 
outside world: As indicated above, Muslim wives in Pakistan can now effect a virtually instant 
divorce as well, although they have to go to a court to claim that right officially. A huge list of 
cases confirms what nobody has as yet analysed in detail:25 Pakistani Muslim wives today can 
divorce their partner with almost the same ease as the man. Apparently, no court will query a 
statement by a Muslim wife that she cannot live with her husband “within the bounds of 
Allah”.26 Thus, in the 1990s, attention has shifted from the earlier prominent Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 to the tiny, innocuous section 8 of the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance, 1961. Both legal provisions have been applied for the benefit of Muslim women in 
Pakistan. This shows that liberal Muslim interpretations and islamisation can and do co-exist in 
modern South Asian Muslim laws, which richly repay further study in this field. 
 
Maintenance law in South Asia is a fascinating area of new developments, much politicised and 
misunderstood so far. The key point to emphasise here is that modern South Asian Muslim law is 
today well-advanced in recognising a divorced Muslim wife’s right to permanent maintenance 
from the ex-husband well beyond the classical idda period. 
 
                                                 
     22 )  The leading case on this is Ali Nawaz Gardezi PLD 1963 SC 51. 
     23 )  The clearest possible case on this is Noor Khan PLD 1982 FSC 265. 
24) In this regard, there are several important cases decided by Mr. Justice Tanzil-ur-Rehman (see above, 
note 
  14). Most useful among these is perhaps Mirza Qamar Raza, reported at PLD 1988 Karachi 169. 
     25 )   For the list of relevant cases and some details see now Balchin, Cassandra (ed.): A Handbook on Family 
Law in Pakistan. Lahore: Shirkat Gah 1994. 
     26 )  This phrase comes from the leading case of Khurshid Bibi, reported at PLD 1967 SC 97.  
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Significantly, and this has caused the politicised confusions in worldwide legal scholarship on 
this topic, this innovation came from the secular Indian law. Thus, it was immediately perceived 
as anti-Islamic and biased. Because of this, hardly anyone bothered to notice that in fact liberal 
Muslim scholarship, and now socially conscious Muslim judicial opinion, too, have come to the 
very same result. 
 
The best starting point to analyse this development briefly appears to be the law concerning a 
Muslim wife’s maintenance during the subsistence of a marriage, which is an obligation on the 
husband. In the frequent cases where Muslim husbands failed to honour that obligation and the 
wife then went to court to claim maintenance under section 488 of the old Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1898, the husband’s easiest remedy was to simply divorce the wife. He would then be 
liable only for any unpaid dower (mahr) and the iddat money. It was to stop such mischief, 
namely the desertion of married Muslim women by careless husbands,27 that the Indian law 
makers introduced a new definition of ‘wife’ for the purposes of the secular maintenance law. 
The revised law is found under sections 125-127 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. As we 
know with utmost clarity today, this was a well-planned social security measure which 
exonerated the state from having to look after the victims of broken marriages and put the onus 
for maintenance on social support networks, in particular husbands and fathers. The new 
definition of ‘wife’ had a drastic impact as gradually, in a series of instructive cases involving 
mainly Muslim spouses, Indian law developed the principle that any divorcing husband would 
have to make adequate arrangements for the maintenance of his former wife.28  
 
Then, in 1985, came the famous case of a 75 year-old lady, Shah Bano, who had been thrown out 
of her comfortable home after more than 40 years of marriage and had been left without adequate 
provision for her old age.29 Remarriage being out of the question, she would have to turn to her 
children or natal family for support. As so often, these were comfortable middle-class people 
fighting over a principle. The Supreme Court of India decided, quite in line with earlier cases, 
that the ex-husband would have to provide the lady adequate maintenance until her last breath. 
The Court, composed of five Hindu judges, had also looked at the Qur’an and had found no 
contradiction between its admonishment to be generous to a divorced wife (as in Qur'an II.240-
242) and the provisions of modern, secular Indian law. Because of some rather unwise comments 
about the need for a uniform civil code in India (and thus the end of Muslim personal law), this 
decision caused riots and much uproar. The government, evidently concerned to undo the 
damage, very quickly passed a new Act for Indian Muslims alone, apparently -- so everyone 
thought - - taking them out of the protective ambit of the 1973 Criminal Procedure Code. While 
this violated the policy directive of legal uniformity, about which everyone concerned raised a 
big storm, nobody seems to have bothered to read the Act carefully. It is called the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and it does exactly what its name says, it 
protects the rights of Muslim divorced wives. But in which way?  
 
                                                 
     27 )  This is today a grave social problem among Muslims, especially in Bangladesh, as discussed further below. 
     28 )  The key case in this respect is Bai Tahira, reported at AIR 1979 SC 362.  
29) The case is reported as Mohammed Ahmed Khan AIR 1985 SC 945. 
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In the politicised confusions which ensued, the Act was vigorously attacked as a law which 
takes away important rights from divorced Muslim wives. However, this is nonsense, as a study 
of the case law under the 1986 Act clearly shows.30 This Act re-constituted precisely the liberal 
Qur’anic interpretation of the Indian Supreme Court and thus reiterates the position of the Shah 
Bano case: A divorced Muslim wife’s first port of call for support is still the ex-husband. It is 
only when he is unable to support the woman that she has a claim on her own heirs and relatives 
and, if those are indigent, too, on the various Waqf Boards which exist in India.31 
 
By now there are several dozens of decided cases under section 3 of the 1986 Act, the material 
provision concerning the ex-husband which every campaigner for women’s rights conveniently 
overlooked. With two exceptions, all those cases hold that Muslim ex-husbands have an 
obligation to make adequate arrangements for their ex-wives for the time beyond the iddat 
period. The fascinating new development here is that such arrangements have to be made during 
the iddat period itself. Thus,  if a husband has not done so, a Muslim wife in India today has an 
instant claim in a court of law, initially a Family Court. What a woman can claim obviously 
depends on circumstances (another instance where traditional shari’a law and modern secular 
law agree, quite sensibly), so an impoverished wife will get nothing from a husband who is 
himself starving, while the former wife of a millionaire, even if she already has a million, may 
get yet another.  
 
Again, thus, the modern South Asian Muslim law relies on the woman to make a claim, and it 
will obviously help the claimant if she has a good cause. The main point, from the state’s 
perspective, of course, is that the state itself does not figure at all among those who are legally or 
morally liable for the financial support of Muslim ex-wives.  During the past few years, these 
significant Indian legal developments have had a spin-off in Bangladesh which must be of prime 
interest to scholars of Islamic law. As indicated, that country faces the huge social problem of 
desertion without proper divorce. In 1995, without a word of reference to Indian law, the High 
Court of Dhaka decided that under Muslim law, as found in the Qur’an, a husband who wishes to 
abandon his wife is responsible for her maintenance beyond the narrow time of the iddat, 
especially if there are children involved.32 This case confirms that Muslim law in South Asia is 
capable of self-expiatory reforms by reference to the shari’a, in this case the Qur’an itself rather 
than the less positive jurists’ opinions on the matter. But this important case has not even been 
noticed outside Bangladesh, because it decided in favour of women, and in Europe we only 
appear to hear bad news about decisions that go against women and their interests. A more 
balanced assessment seems now possible. 
 
                                                 
30) Werner Menski,"Maintenance for Divorced Muslim Wives", Kerala Law Times, Journal Section, 
1994(1),  45-52. 
     31 )  A very recent case on this, actually the first Supreme Court case under the 1986 Act, is Tamil Nadu Wakf 
 Board, at 1996(2) Kerala Law Times 410 (SC). 
 
     32 )  The case is Hefzur Rehman, reported at 15 Bangladesh Legal Decisions (1995), 34. 
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In stark contrast, Pakistani law still takes the ijma-focused juristic view that Muslim divorced 
wives are only entitled to maintenance during the iddat period. In real life, as fieldwork quickly 
confirms, even that is very often not given. There seems to be a social contract in Pakistani 
society that a woman’s natal family will provide for her in the eventuality of a divorce.  Looking 
at the Bangladeshi example, however, it appears that the door on reforms is not closed, since  this 
would not in fact go against the spirit of the shari’a and, equally important, does not necessitate 
explicit adoption of Western or Hindu legal models. 
 
Both in the field of public law and family law, therefore, modern South Asian Muslim law 
increasingly emphasises the historic justice-orientation of Islamic law and uses it to back up 
recent law reforms with significant positive impact on women and other structurally 
disadvantaged sections of the community. There is as yet no coherence in such reforms and, as 
always, daily implementation of such laws remains a problem, but the conceptual avenues for 
modern South Asian law reforms which do not violate the spirit of Islamic law have been 
sketched out and are actually used in daily legal practice in these countries.   
 
In this context, two other recent developments deserve a brief mention here. Firstly, a prominent 
area of concern among writers on Pakistani law has been that female victims of rapists were 
convicted for zina on the evidentiary basis of their pregnancy, while the men were let off on the 
ground of insufficient evidence. One could of course have used the new DNA techniques to pin 
down such rapists, but in the heated debates about the injustice to women this has been 
overlooked. I see an absence of legal interest in convicting men for rape, while it remains 
obvious that even strict penalties, as stipulated in the law, will not protect women against rape. 
The fact that it cannot be just and proper, under any legal system, to convict the victim of rape 
rather than the rapist has been addressed in a powerful very recent judgment.33 Significantly, the 
learned judge, Dr. Ghous Mohammed, used Islamic rhetoric as well as comparative legal 
techniques to come to a justice-focused assessment of this difficult socio-legal problem in a 
contemporary Muslim society. 
 
Finally, among the growing population of South Asian Muslims in Europe, all the issues 
discussed in this article are of great interest. It is indeed a fact that South Asian migrants in 
Europe have not abandoned their adherence to shari’a, or what they imagine it to be. They 
operate today, as ongoing research in Britain and other countries demonstrates with increasing 
clarity, an intricate combination of adherence to South Asian legal traditions (which are not 
necessarily those of the statute law, but are mainly inspired by custom and religious traditions) 
and of the respective official state law. So a Pakistani Muslim living in Britain may cleverly 
arrange a polygamous marriage without falling foul of English law, will still divorce his wife by 
talaq first and then go to the English law. He will also seek to rely on Muslim traditions which 
allow him not to pay maintenance to his ex-wife unless modern state law reminds him of such an 
obligation which is not, as we saw here, unknown to Islamic law after all. In this way, detailed 
knowledge about South Asian legal developments today is also becoming increasingly important 
for lawyers and social scientists anywhere in Europe. Today, South Asian Muslim law is not 
some quaint Orientalist hobby, it has become a direct part of our own legal experience in Europe 
and it deserves much more detailed study in the future.  
                                                 
     33 )  The judgment is reported as Rani PLD 1996 Karachi 316. 
